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Omitted easements in the Torrens system:
Devising a better strategy
Lynden Griggs*
The law on omitted easements as an exception to indefeasibility is in a
mess. With jurisdictional differences all too evident, and the parties often
overwhelmed by the cost of litigation, law and community expectation are
unaligned. This article seeks to connect the practice with the law and to
argue in favour of a wide and expansive view as to when the exception
applies. The approach suggested consists of a wide exception for omitted
easements to indefeasibility together with a ‘conclusive evidence’ provision
in the legislation that the recording of the easement on the dominant
tenement establishes the existence of that easement. This approach is
supported by history, authority, and by reference to the underlying integrity of
the land administration system.
Introduction
Described as complex, unsatisfactory, and potentially masking traps for
unwary purchasers,1 the law relating to the regulation of omitted easements as
an exception to indefeasibility in Australia is in a mess. And it needs to be
fixed. To have decisions which depend on the border in which one resides, and
to be reliant on archaic legislative provisions undermine any certainty that can
be given by lawyers to clients, and force parties to litigate for years to resolve
disputes. The current approach is unwarranted, expensive, and arguably
serving only the commercial interests of the engaged lawyers. Also, the results
that come from easement litigation are often seen as unjust. To have situations
where a neighbour has used a route over another’s land for decades without
disputation, and suddenly find that they are blocked from using that way can
seem, and have been seen as highly unsatisfactory.2
What we have seen recently in the jurisdictions of Tasmania and New South
Wales is extensive litigation concerning something as simple as a right of
access. Obviously, in a utopian vision of the Torrens register, the register
would have all interests that pertain to that parcel noted on the title. That, of
course, does not happen. It never will, and certain interests will always, and
have always been exempt from the operation of indefeasibility. Omitted
easements are one of those exceptions. What we need is something that
connects the law with the social practice, because we know that when the two
are in conflict, the law will take priority.3 But it is the unpredictability of the
legal outcomes that necessitates a method that seeks to connect the doctrinal
principles with what occurs on the ground, with this married to an objective
* Academic, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
1 Peter Butt, ‘Conveyancing and Property’ (2017) 91 Australian Law Journal 401, 406.
2 Eg, see the facts of Treweeke v 36 Wolseley Road Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 274; Clarence
City Council v Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226 (‘Howlin’).
3 See John A Humbach, ‘Property as Prophesy: Legal Realism and the Indeterminacy of
Ownership’ (2017) 49 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 211, 212.
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understanding of what reasonable people would expect. Our legal system is
enhanced when outcomes meet community expectations. ‘Law, being a
practical thing, must found itself on actual forces.’4
What has occurred in Australia, a nation of independent states, as regards
land administration has been the evolution of the omitted easements
exceptions in a way that is jurisdictionally idiosyncratic, ad hoc, and iterative
to problems as they were encountered. This development, understandable
given the localised nature of the dispute and the response, undermines any
search for a holistic overview of the one common law that is supposedly the
private law of Australia.5 It also undermines the practical forces that have
given rise to the use of easements, particularly for access. In essence, it
reflects competing forces. On the one hand, there is the private right to exclude
others from one’s land.6 On the other, the law that wants to see land being
productively used — land for which there is no access because no easement
exists — fails to achieve this.7
In this article, the approaches of the jurisdictions are outlined as to how they
respond to the problem of omitted easements. New South Wales is closely
examined against the lens of the arguably unsatisfactory decision of the High
Court in Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd.8 By contrast
to New South Wales, Tasmania will then be considered, with its exception
more widely drawn than in New South Wales, but which was also shown to
inadequately respond or deal with the decade-long litigation that led to
Clarence City Council v Howlin.9 As Pearce J lamented in the latter case:
I cannot conclude my reasons without making one brief but, I think, important final
observation. Protracted litigation has generated much expense, delay and ill-feeling.
It has continued for more than a decade. This is not the time for attribution of fault
... I would have thought that with goodwill, an open mind, realistic expectations and
the willingness to make reasonable concession or compromise, resolution of the
outstanding areas of disagreement can and should be reached.10
There will also be a brief reference to the jurisdictions of the other states and
territories, thematically drawn to highlight how the legislation is drafted and
has been interpreted. What will be argued is that the suggestions of the
Victorian Law Reform Commission proposals of 201011 present an approach
4 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Little Brown, 1881) 206, 213.
5 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151–2 [135].
6 This of course seen in the common law world as very much prized: ‘[It is] one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property’: Kaiser
Aetna v United States, 444 US 164, 176 (1979). See also Jonathan Klick and Gideon
Parchomovsky, ‘The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical Assessment’ (2016) 165
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 917 <http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2638&context=faculty_scholarship>.
7 See generally the article by Kenneth A Stahl, ‘The Trespass/Nuisance Divide and the Law
of the Easements’ (2017) George Washington Law Review (forthcoming)
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3054700_code817953.pdf?abstractid
=3054700&mirid=1&type=2>.
8 (2013) 247 CLR 149 (‘Castle Constructions’).
9 (2016) 219 LGERA 226.
10 Ibid 267 [137].
11 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Easements and Covenants, Final Report No 22, 14
[24].
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which should be commended to all states. This approach argued in favour of
a wide and expansive exception to indefeasibility, and when combined with a
legislative rule that the registration and appearance of an easement on the
dominant title, even if absent on the burdened title, is conclusive evidence of
the existence of this easement, will lead to an outcome that is justified in the
interests of clarity, consistency, and coherence with what the original drafters
of the Torrens legislation intended.12 It is what is needed to avoid litigation of
the ilk of Castle Constructions and Howlin. This approach is also consistent
with history and precedent, with turn of the 20th century Victorian authority13
providing further support for this course of action.
Given this context, this article will first outline the current law relating to
the omitted easements exception to indefeasibility in Australia. The second
part will briefly consider how the omitted easements exception came into
existence, remembering of course that Sir Robert Torrens designed his land
administration system with a passionate emphasis on the integrity of the
system being aligned with the integrity of the register. Two decisions will then
be examined, one emanating from New South Wales and its idiosyncratic view
of when omitted easements are an exception, an approach seen as very narrow
— this being Castle Constructions which ended in the High Court. This will
be followed by a discussion of the energy-sapping Tasmanian matter of
Howlin, which ultimately saw the first statutory easement created in 140 years
imposed by reason of public interest, with this needed as the so-called wide
exception for omitted easements in that state failed to deliver an outcome that
many might have expected. This comparison will demonstrate that
irrespective of whether the Parliament has passed a perceived broad approach
to the recognition of unregistered or omitted easements, or one which is
narrow, problems and confusion abound. This can only be overcome by a
simplified approach, hopefully adopted nationally,14 with this supporting the
development of a national jurisprudence in this area which will further deliver
clarity and consistency, as well as ensure that the results are not dictated by
locale.
The importance of this cannot be underestimated. Property interests such as
easements, while born out of the Industrial Revolution but with roots back to
Roman times,15 developed their summative legal principles at approximately
12 As noted in Dobbie v Davidson (1991) 23 NSWLR 625 (‘Dobbie’), three approaches are
possible in terms of interpreting the omitted easements exception to indefeasibility. One
could do a textual approach based on the wording in the legislation, another is to consider
the case law that has evolved, and there is also an historical examination. See the judgment
beginning at 636 (Priestley JA). It is considered that the historical examination is most
appropriate as it strips back the thinking and allows a re-examination from first principles
and what was intended by the introduction of this exception.
13 Webster v Strong (1926) VLR 509; Stevenson v James (1889) 15 VLR 615; Re Transfer of
Land Statute and Application of Byrne; Ex parte Metropolitan Permanent Building and
Investment Society (1884) 10 VLR (L) 631.
14 For a discussion of this issue, see Tina Hunter, ‘Uniform Torrens Title legislation: Is there
a will and a way?’ (2010) 18 Australian Property Law Journal 201.
15 For a discussion of the history associated with the evolution of easements, see Paul T Babie,
‘How Property Law Shapes our Landscapes’ (2012) 38 Monash University Law Review 1,
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the same time as the establishment of the Torrens system.16 Given this, it is not
surprising that easements were not seen as a central concern in the
establishment of the Torrens system. Today we know that incorporeal
hereditaments of this nature shape the relationship that we have with our
neighbours and the community in which we live. These rights will often
provide the only means of access to land, and will almost certainly make the
land more livable and hospitable, allowing persons to live in harmony with a
shared purpose. To allow a system to remain embedding complexity and
confusion only demeans property and its ‘fundamental and pervasive social
practice’.17
The current law of omitted easements
The current law demonstrates a number of divergent approaches, each with
distinctive differences. Victoria and Western Australia have the broadest
exception to indefeasibility, with the exception in Victoria being for any
easement howsoever acquired subsisting over, upon or affecting the land.18
Western Australia is to a very similar effect.19
Tasmania’s similarly moves in a direction of a wide understanding as to
when easements are an exception to indefeasibility. The wording, somewhat
complex, is as follows:
(e) [there is an exception to indefeasibility], so far as regards —
(i) an easement arising by implication or under a statute which would have
given rise to a legal interest if the servient land had not been registered land;
or
(ia) an easement created by deed but unintentionally omitted from the
folio of the Register for the servient land when that servient land was
brought under this Act or the repealed Act; or
(ib) an easement that has been created under this Act but unintentionally
omitted from the folio of the Register for the servient land; or
(ii) an equitable easement, except as against a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of the easement who has lodged a transfer for registration;20
Legislation in the other states and territories is phrased more narrowly.
Queensland and the Northern Territory21 have sought to resolve the issue
somewhat by providing a definition of what ‘omission’ means. For example in
6–9; Lyria Bennett Moses and Cathy S Sherry, ‘Unregistered Access: Wheeldon v Burrows
Easements and Easements by Prescription over Torrens Land’ (2007) 81 Australian Law
Journal 491.
16 Brendan Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law (Lawbook Co, 7th ed, 2017) [9.50]: ‘many of
[easements] salient features were not settled until the mid-19th century’. The first Torrens
legislation was Real Property Act 1858 (SA), which commenced on 1 July 1858.
17 Humbach, above n 3, 211.
18 Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 42(2)(d).
19 Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 68(1A).
(1A) Despite subsection (1), the land which shall be included in any certificate of title or
registered instrument shall be deemed to be subject to ... any easements acquired by
enjoyment or user or subsisting over or upon or affecting such land ...
20 Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40(3)(e).
21 See Land Title Act 2000 (NT) s 189:
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an easement is taken to have been omitted if:
336 (2018) 26 Australian Property Law Journal
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Queensland, there is an exception of an interest of a person if the particulars
of the easement have been omitted from the register, with omission defined as
follows:
(3) For subsection (1)(c), the particulars of an easement (the ‘easement particulars’)
are taken to have been omitted from the freehold land register only if —
(a) the easement was in existence when the lot burdened by it was first
registered, but the easement particulars have never been recorded in the
freehold land register against the lot; or
(b) the easement particulars have previously been recorded in the freehold land
register, but the current particulars in the freehold land register about the lot
do not include the easement particulars, other than because the easement has
been extinguished in relation to the lot; or
(c) the instrument providing for the easement was lodged for registration but,
because of an error of the registrar, has never been registered.22
In the remaining jurisdictions, where the word ‘omission’ is not defined, the
substantive provision providing for the protection of the omitted easement is
largely the same — the unregistered interest will not be defeated by
indefeasibility where it is not described, omitted, or misdescribed from the
register.23 This is somewhat mirrored in South Australia.24 New South Wales
is somewhat distinctive with its two limbs, which, as will be shown, have been
interpreted in contrasting ways.
(a1) in the case of the omission or misdescription of an easement subsisting
immediately before the land was brought under the provisions of this Act [the first
limb] or validly created at or after that time under this or any other Act or a
Commonwealth Act [the second limb].25
(a) the easement was in existence when the lot burdened by it was first registered
but particulars are no longer recorded in the land register against the lot
burdened; or
(b) the easement was registered but later omitted by an error of the
Registrar-General.
22 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 185(1C).
23 Eg, in the Australian Capital Territory, the word omission is not used: The Australian Capital
Territory similarly has a broad view (Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 58(1)(b)):
(1) [A] person becoming registered as proprietor of land or of any interest in land under
this Act shall, except in case of fraud, hold the land or interest, subject to such interests
as are notified on the folium of the register constituted by the grant or certificate of title
of the land, but absolutely free from all other interests whatsoever except as to — ...
(b) any right of way or other easement created in or existing upon the same land
which is not described, or is misdescribed in the relative certificate of title; ...
24 Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 69:
The title of every registered proprietor of land shall, subject to such encumbrances, liens,
estates, or interests as may be notified on the certificate of title of such land, be absolute
and indefeasible, subject only to the following qualifications: ...
(d) Omission of easement
where a right-of-way or other easement not barred or avoided by the provisions of the
Rights-of-Way Act 1881 or of this Act, has been omitted or mis-described in any
certificate, or other instrument of title: In which case such right-of-way or other
easement shall prevail, but subject to the provisions of the said Rights-of-Way Act 1881
and of this Act; ...
25 Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 42(1)(a1).
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The questions are, what does one make of the morass of this legislation, and
can an overarching position for all Australian jurisdictions be reached? It
seems clear that where the easement is created prior to the land becoming
registered Torrens land, the easement is protected throughout the states and
territories;26 though in South Australia, this would only apply where the
easement is created prior to the now repealed Rights-of-Way Act 1881 (SA).27
Far more problematic is where the easement is created at some time
subsequent to the servient tenement becoming part of the Torrens register, but
which for reasons which are most likely lost in the mists of time, no longer
appears on the title of the servient tenement. It is this area where the litigation
has occurred, at present as well as in the past.28 This legislative quagmire also
provides, as Burns notes, in the context of implied easements, a singularly
one-dimensional analysis.29 The question being asked is whether easements,
and if so, what easements, should be an exception to indefeasibility.
The one-dimensional analysis has had a peculiar effect. Tasmania simply relies on
the policy of the general law (legislatively modified) ... Victoria, Western Australia
and the ACT similarly does so.
The three narrower approaches demonstrated in NSW (and generally Queensland
and the Northern Territory) ... are arguably no better. When an implied easement
arises before land is transferred to the Torrens system, then the easement is
considered to be an omitted easement, determined by reference solely to the general
law without any analysis of whether such an easement is relevant to modern
conditions.30
In endorsing this view, what I would suggest is that the approach taken today
in determining what the national framework should be for the omitted
easements exception needs to be based on two factors — the historical
provenance of where we came from, what was intended by the introduction of
this exception, and the normative integrity of the Torrens system. Where do
we come from informs where we are going. If these points are kept in mind,
then the argument for legislative adjustment and clarification is
overwhelming.
The decision in Castle Constructions31
The facts of this case were relatively simple. Textually, they can be described
as follows: In 1921, a Mr Davis was the transferee of 134 Sailors Bay Road,
Sydney. An easement was created over this parcel in favour of adjacent land
at 69 Strathallan Avenue. This easement gave the Strathallan Land access over
the parcel at 134 Sailors Bay Road to Sailors Bay Road itself. We now move
forward to the turn of the millennium and the current owners of the Strathallan
26 James v Registrar-General [1968] 1 NSWR 310; Rock v Todeschino [1983] 1 Qd R 356.
27 Lean v Maurice (1874) 8 SALR 119.
28 For past examples, see Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227; Di Masi v Piromalli [1980] WAR
57.
29 Fiona Burns, ‘Implied Easements and the Integrity of the Torrens System’ (2009) 21(2) Bond
Law Review 1, 21.
30 Ibid.
31 An exceptional summary of the case can be located at Jennifer Stuckey-Clarke, ‘Removal of
Easements and the Exception to Indefeasibility: Castle Constructions v Sahab Holdings’
(2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 581.
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Land are Mr and Mrs Howard. Castle Constructions owns 134 Sailors Bay
Road. Castle sought to have the easement expunged on the basis that the
original easement was only ever intended to give Davis a personal right to use
the access route. Pursuant to the legislation, the Howards were informed and
did not seek to object to the removal of the easement. The Registrar-General
removed the easement. Some 7 years later, the respondents to the High Court
matter, Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd, now owns the Strathallan Land. Sahab
Holdings seeks to have the easement reinstated, with this denied by the
Registrar-General.
Descriptively,32 the land can be represented as such:
Sahab then sought a declaration in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
for an order to restore the easement. At first instance they were unsuccessful,33
with this reversed by the Court of Appeal. The High Court then overturned the
decision of the Court of Appeal. Castle Constructions won.
32 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (2011) 15 BPR 29,627, 29,633 [3].
33 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General [No 2] (2010) 14 BPR 27,459.
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Court of Appeal34
The Court of Appeal, in interpreting the aforesaid NSW legislation, applied
the earlier decision of the same court in Dobbie v Davidson.35 ‘Omission’
merely meant something ‘left out’ or ‘not there’. Accordingly, it did not matter
where the omission related to an easement that existed before the land was
brought under the Torrens legislation (the first limb of this section), or validly
created after that time (the second limb). Whereas Dobbie v Davidson had
involved the construction of the first limb of s 41(1)(a1), and Castle
Constructions involved the second limb, the ‘legislative history of the
exception embodied [in the legislation] and a mandated literal construction of
the section itself’36 led to the result in favour of Sahab. The Registrar-General
had the legislative power to correct the title and restore the easement and had
failed to do so. Critically, and specifically in terms of how the High Court
came to a different conclusion, indefeasibility did not pose an obstacle as the
omitted easements exception was legislatively carved away from this notion
of paramountcy. It is worth citing the relevant paragraph from the Court of
Appeal’s judgment in full.37
One difficulty facing Castle’s reliance on the concept of indefeasibility is that the
right of way burdened its title when its interest in 134 Sailors Bay was first registered
in 2001. There was no relevant defect in its title that was cured by Castle becoming
registered proprietor of ... Sailors Bay. It was only after it became registered that it
made the 2001 Request to the Registrar-General to delete the right of way from its
title. This was done in that the Registrar-General removed, cancelled or expunged (it
matters not) the recording of the right of way from the relevant folios of the Register.
But this was due to the act ... of Castle as registered proprietor of the relevant land.
The correction of the Register now to reinstate Castle’s title to what it was at the time
its interest in 134 Sailors Bay was registered (burdened as it was by the right of way)
does not involve the setting aside of Castle’s title at the time it became indefeasible:
rather it confirms the state of its title at that time.38
The High Court39
Without any disagreement as to the underlying facts, the High Court held
against Sahab and found in favour of Castle Constructions. Perhaps reflecting
the orthodoxy that each issuance of a certificate of title involves the
relinquishment of the previous title and the grant from the Crown of a new
title,40 Dobbie was distinguishable. This case was not relevant as this decision
was based on the first limb of the New South Wales’ omitted easements
exception, the first limb rightly dealt with a case where the easement was ‘not
there’, or had been ‘left out’. But this was not the case when the easement
related to the second limb of s 42(1)(a1).
34 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (2011) 15 BPR 29, 627.
35 (1991) 23 NSWLR 625 (‘Dobbie’).
36 Stuckey-Clarke, above n 31, 583.
37 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (2011) 15 BPR 29, 627, 29,679 [244].
38 Ibid.
39 Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 149.
40 Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook Co, 5th ed, 2006) [2003].
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Other considerations intrude when an easement created under the RPA by
registration of a dealing has later been removed by the Registrar-General. When an
easement has been previously recorded on the Register, but is no longer recorded
because it has been deliberately removed from the Register, it could be said that the
easement was ‘not there’. It is more accurate, however, to say that the easement is
‘no longer there because it has been removed’. The significance to be given to the
fact of the easement’s removal from the Register requires attention to fundamental
principles. The relevant exception to the paramountcy of the registered proprietor’s
title is ‘in the case of the omission’ of an easement (where the hypothesis is that the
easement continues to exist but is not recorded). Because the RPA provided for title
by registration, the deliberate removal from the Register of an easement created by
registration cannot be treated as a ‘case of the omission ... of an easement’ for the
purposes of s 42(1)(a1). The presupposition for the operation of s 42(1)(a1) that the
easement continues to exist, is not valid. The easement has been removed from the
Register.41
Stuckey-Clarke cogently criticises the decision as an attack on the
credibility of the Torrens system. In her view, ‘[t]he “fundamental principle”
of indefeasibility has been applied to effect arbitrary consequences which are
not in the interests of justice.’42 And it is suggested that this is very much at
the heart of the argument. Should the integrity of the Torrens system be
aligned simply with the integrity of the register, or are there more overarching
ideas in play? If the answer here is that the register is the system, then the High
Court decision has much to be commended for. When Sahab purchased their
land, there was no easement attached to that title, and they knew that upon
purchase, the easement had been cancelled some 6 years earlier.43 The current
certificate of title showed no easement, and with Torrens land eschewing any
derivative recognition of past interests in the land, the easement could not be
regained. They had willingly bought the title without the easement, and were
arguably seeking to gain a windfall advantage that would come from the
additional access that it would give. But if the integrity of the Torrens system
is wider than simply the integrity of the register, then the decision of the NSW
Court of Appeal is to be preferred. There had been an easement on this land
which had been intentionally removed in circumstances where this should not
have occurred.44 All that was being done by allowing the easement to be
reinserted back onto the register was restoring the title to the land as it should
41 Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 149, 160–1 [25]
(emphasis omitted). It should be noted that Sahab subsequently went back before the High
Court to reargue the matter. This was rejected as the Court saw this as an attempt to litigate
issues that had already been resolved. Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v Sahab Holdings Pty
Ltd [No 2] (2013) 303 ALR 84, 89 [26]:
The matters advanced by Sahab in the affidavits of its solicitor and in its written
submissions demonstrate no arguable case that this Court misapprehended any question
of fact or law. Nor do the affidavits or the written submissions show that Sahab now seeks
to advance arguments which it did not advance at the original hearing. All that is shown
is that Sahab disagrees with the conclusions reached by this Court and that it seeks a
second opportunity to persuade the Court that the view of the construction and
application of the relevant provisions of the RPA articulated by the solicitor for Sahab is
preferable to the view formed by the Court. That should not be permitted.
42 Stuckey-Clarke, above n 31, 585.
43 Sahab Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar-General [No 2] (2010) 14 BPR 27,459, 27,467 [46].
44 Ibid 27,464 [29]:
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have been. Perhaps this was a unique interpretation of the narrow NSW
legislation, though as we will see in the saga of the Tasmanian Howlin
litigation, even a wider understanding of the omitted easements exception can
fail to assist. The problem, it is suggested, is in the unique nature of the
legislation of each state and the failure of a national understanding and
jurisprudence in the Australian law of easements.
The 10-year litigation in Howlin
The 10-year saga of this litigation, of which omitted easements is only a part,
arose out of an attempt by an owner of land to subdivide part of the property
owned by him and family members.45 To enable subdivision of the Howlin
land as shown on the diagram below, the owner first sought in respect of what
is shown on the illustration as a ‘proposed roadway’, and which is commonly
known as Marsh Street, an order that that roadway be recognised as a public
highway. When this was refused, it led ultimately to the current litigation
whereby the owners of the lots on either side of the proposed roadway sought
a guarantee of access from Spitfarm Road, over and through the disputed land
bordering that road (shown as Lot A on the diagram).46 These owners of the
land adjoining Marsh Street claimed to be entitled to an easement over Lot A,
and while some of their titles showed the existence of an easement, the title
to Lot A (the supposed servient tenement) did not evidence any burden.
Simply said, indefeasibility was a barrier to recognition of an easement, unless
the omitted easements exception, or some other basis, could be used to support
the existence of an easement.
In summary, properly construed the Middleton transfer created a permanent right of way
over the land, which is now 134 Sailors Bay [Road]. The rights conferred on the
registered proprietor of 69 Strathallan [Avenue] did not end when Mr Davis ceased to be
its registered proprietor.
45 For a full list of the litigation, see Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 235–6 [24]–[25]. It
exceeds 10 decisions, including matters before the Resource Management and Planning
Appeal Tribunal, the Tasmanian Supreme Court, the Appellate Court of Tasmania and an
application to the High Court where special leave to appeal was refused.
46 Survey diagram attached to the judgment in Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 231 [3].
342 (2018) 26 Australian Property Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 51 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Apr 10 18:00:28 2018
/journals/journal/aplj/vol26pt3/part_3
The decision of Pearce J
In what ultimately was a historic decision, evoking for the first time the use
of s 84J of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) which
allows the imposition of a statutory easement, the reasoning began with an
appeal to the core aspect of the Torrens system. It is a system of registration
of title, and his Honour, in quoting from the High Court in Queensland
Premier Mines Pty Ltd v French, noted that:
One of the fundamental purposes of the Torrens system ... is to give effect to an
important public policy. That policy is that the land title register should be sufficient
of itself to inform those concerned about the nature and extent of any outstanding
interest in relation to the land.47
The easements exception to indefeasibility in the Tasmanian legislation is
rather convoluted in its language and form, with this largely a result of the
previous High Court decision in Parramore v Duggan.48 This earlier High
Court decision was based on the wording of the Tasmanian omitted easements
exception that only contained paras (i) and (ii) of the previously cited
legislation. In this case, an express easement had been granted over the
servient land when the land was held under the general law system of
registration. Subsequently, both the dominant and servient tenements were
converted to Torrens title, with the dominant title showing the benefit of the
easement, and the servient title not. At both the trial judge and the appellate
47 (2007) 235 CLR 81, 90 [14] (Pearce J).
48 (1995) 183 CLR 633.
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level in Tasmania,49 the decision was in favour of the dominant tenement
owners. The easement had been omitted and was covered by this provision,
the Tasmanian courts suggesting that to make sense of the provision, the word
‘or’, as noted in italics, had to be read into the legislation:
(i) an easement arising by implication or under a statute [or] which would have
given rise to a legal interest if the servient land had not been registered land50
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the reluctance of courts to introduce additional
words into the statute, the High Court strongly rebuked the Tasmanian courts.
The decision was unanimously in favour of the servient tenement, though as
Butt notes:
[O]ne cannot help the sneaking suspicion that the drafter’s pen slipped, and that ‘or’
was inadvertently omitted from the text of the Bill This appears from the
Minister’s speech introducing the Bill: ‘to declare the present law as interpreted
by the courts’. The three categories of exception envisaged by the Tasmanian judges
[easements by implication, easements under a statute, and easements giving rise to
a legal interest if the land was not Torrens land] in fact reflect what the courts have
seen as the general legislative approach to ‘omitted’ easements ever since the
Torrens system was first introduced ...51
With this background in mind, Pearce J in Howlin accepted that the easement
had been unintentionally omitted from the folio of the register, with this clear
from the terms of the transfer and the existence of the easement on the
dominant tenements. As to why they were not recorded on the dominant
tenements, no explanation was possible. At the time of registration, the
Recorder of Titles had no obligation to enter a memorial of the instrument
creating the easement on the servient tenement, a practice which is different
today.52
Despite this recognition of unintentional omission, the legislation did not
assist. Section 40(3)(ia) was undoubtedly introduced
post-Parramore v Duggan, and designed to address the problems highlighted
in that case, which involved an easement being created over servient land and
then omitted from the title of the servient land once the land is registered
49 Duggan v Parramore (1993) 2 Tas R 442; Parramore v Duggan (1994) 4 Tas R 64.
50 Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 40(3)(i).
51 Peter Butt, ‘Conveyancing’ (1996) 70 Australian Law Journal 345, 347 (citation omitted).
52 Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 251–2 [83]. Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 105(3) provides:
(3) The Recorder, when registering a memorandum of transfer or lease which grants or
reserves an easement, shall record the grant or reservation upon —
(a) the folio of the Register, or the registered lease, evidencing title to the land
burdened by the easement; and
(b) there the land benefited by the easement is registered land, the folio of the
Register or the registered lease which evidences title to the land benefited.
When looking at a schedule of easements, created pursuant to a subdivision, eg, Local
Government (Building and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1993 (Tas) s 99(1)(c) provides,
though note that it is expressed in the permissive:
(c) the Recorder of Titles may notify the existence of the easement, profit a prendre or
covenant on the folio in respect of land —
(i) benefited by any easement or profit a prendre; or
(ii) burdened by any easement, profit a prendre or covenant.
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under the Torrens system.53 It did not apply in this scenario because the land
was already under the Torrens system, and there is no clear explanation as to
the absence of the notation on the servient land.54
Pearce J, presumably dissatisfied with this outcome, and as noted, in a first
for Tasmania, used s 84J of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884
to establish a statutory easement in favour of the plaintiff landowners. While
equivalent provisions are commonly used in other jurisdictions,55 it is possible
that the reduced urban density of Tasmania, the cheaper availability of
housing, the lesser use of strata titles, and a wider exception for omitted
easements have meant that calls for its use has been rarely made.
Section 84J(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas)
provides:
Subject to this section, where the Supreme Court is satisfied that to facilitate the
reasonable user of any land (in this section referred to as ‘the dominant land’) for
some public or private purpose it is consistent with the public interest that a statutory
right of user should be created over other land (in this section referred to as ‘the
servient land’) it may, by order, impose upon the servient land, or on the owner for
the time being thereof, an obligation of user or an obligation to permit the user of
that land in accordance with the order.
The Tasmanian Court did note that the use of this legislation had to be
approached with significant caution, involving as it does, a reordering of
registered property rights.56 But with this cautionary note in mind, his Honour
held that the legislative requirements had been amply met. With reference to
the use of the land for residential purposes; the geography of the area; the
orientation of the houses; the well-utilised gravel road; the use of council of
vehicles and other utility providers; the existence of service poles for
electricity and telecommunications; and the establishment of a sign denoting
Marsh Street, the indications were there that the imposition of an easement
was not only a reasonable use of the land, but also that it was consistent with
the public interest.57 But this alone did not answer the inquiry. Regard had to
be had to the consequences of imposing such an order, and the discretion to
be exercised by a decision-maker was only permissive, even if the criteria had
been met.58 In this matter, however, the discretion was to be exercised in
favour the dominant owners.
While the plaintiffs were ultimately successful in establishing an easement,
in the view of this author, the process was at best unwieldy, and at worst,
expensive, stressful, and fraught with the possibility that success would not
eventuate. It sends a very cautionary message to any conveyancer acting for
53 Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 252–3 [84].
54 It should also be noted that the equitable easements exception to indefeasibility was
unavailable as well, see Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 256–7 [96]–[97].
55 For an exceptional account of the issues in this area, see the work of Scott Grattan,
‘Proprietarian Conceptions of Statutory Access Rights’, in Elizabeth Cooke (ed), Modern
Studies of Property Law (Hart Publishing, 2003) vol 2, 353–74; Scott Grattan, ‘The name(s)
of the rose: personality, preferences and court-imposed easements’ (2004) 10 Canterbury
Law Review 329.
56 Howlin (2016) 219 LGERA 226, 259 [108].
57 Ibid 260–1 [109]–[110].
58 Ibid 261 [113].
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a purchaser. Given Torrens wanted a system that was non-derivative, and
required no searching beyond the current state of the title in question, the
consequence of decisions such as Howlin and Castle Constructions that
appear to require title searching of nearby properties, appears incongruous at
best. It is simply impossible to know how many titles are affected in the way
demonstrated in Howlin, and while past practices are not replicated today, is
it ’safe for lawyers or conveyancers, acting on a purchase or mortgage of land,
to search only the title to the land being purchased or mortgaged’.59
Developing a new solution
As to what solution should be adopted, there are, as noted in Dobbie v
Davidson60 three possible theoretical approaches. Our lens could be textual,
and literally analyse the legislative frameworks to ascertain the correct
approach. Or, the search for linguistic meaning could be purposive with this
informed by the cases. But neither of these will consider the matter from first
principles or from the genesis of the legislation, or indeed have a national
perspective. It is this to which we must look. Any failure to do this will only
perpetuate the state-based, idiosyncratic understanding of what we are trying
to achieve. It is through this examination of the basal elements of what was
intended, (that is, where the law has come from) that we can judge how
complicated the omitted easements exception has become and why a fresh
approach is now needed (where the law on easements should be heading).
When starting from first principles, one, of course, begins from the
mysticism of indefeasibility.
The enduring issue in Torrens title jurisprudence and analysis — the question ‘which
has transcended all others’, according to the great Torrens scholar Professor Douglas
Whalan — is as to when ‘the magical protective armour of indefeasibility’ is
‘donned’ by a title. That it was ‘magical’ was its key sales pitch. How magical,
however, was — and is — the question.61
In answering this issue as to how magical it was, we know that omitted
easements were an exception from the very first legislative incarnation, and it
was very widely drafted, with indefeasibility simply qualified by the
‘omission or misdescription of any right-of-way or other easement’.62 The
word ‘omission’ was not to be qualified in any way.63 The historical
documents of the time evidencing a view that access or a right of way that had
previously existed before the operation of what was to become known as the
Torrens system was not to be lost by the magic of indefeasibility.64 As to why
this occurred, we can only speculate, but it is more than likely that the
surveying difficulties that were present in the new colony of South Australia,65
the need to ensure the success of the momentous land reform project that saw
59 Peter Butt, ‘Conveyancing and property’ (2016) 90 Australian Law Journal 217, 219.
60 (1991) 23 NSWLR 625.
61 Rosalind Croucher, ‘150 years of Torrens — Too much, too little, too soon, too late?’ (2009)
31 Australian Bar Review 245, 261.
62 Dobbie v Davidson (1991) 23 NSWLR 625, 649.
63 Ibid 655.
64 Ibid 651.
65 Croucher, above n 61, 263.
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Robert Torrens top the electoral poll in 1857 with his campaign built squarely
on the transformation of land law’s core principles,66 drove Torrens to concede
this exception in the original legislation,67 even though his original text68
explaining his law reform project makes no reference to easements
whatsoever — perhaps not surprising given as previously noted, the doctrinal
knowledge of easements was being developed in the common law courts of
England at around the same time as the introduction of the Torrens legislation.
If time had stood still, and all jurisdictions had adopted a similar wording,
perhaps the aforesaid cases would never have occurred. But of course, what
we have seen, with federation undoubtedly contributing to the imbroglio that
we now have, is the evolution of different circumstances and different
responses designed to address perceived shortcomings at a particular time —
the changes made in Tasmania post-Parramore v Duggan69 emblematic of
that. The confusion surrounding, or perhaps more accurately, the lack of
importance given to the topic of omitted easements also shown by the range
of responses in those jurisdictions that contemplated Torrens title.70 When
Peter Butt expressed (or perhaps bemoaned) in 1987 about ‘Yet Another
Omitted Easement’,71 he may have legitimately thought that 30 years hence
we might have come to a national jurisprudence as to when the pedestal of
indefeasibility is to be weakened by a right of way that is on the title of the
dominant tenement but is missing from the title of the servient landowner.
Sadly, that has not occurred.
In terms of solutions, we could leave things as they are, and impose litigants
such as Sahab and the plaintiffs in Howlin to long, stressful and expensive
litigations, but that seems to achieve littler other than to encourage the use of
court-imposed easements as a way to ameliorate or soften the harshness of the
legislative exception as interpreted by the judicial system. These statutory
easements do have the capacity to make a practical resolution to an issue
around access, but a:
newly registered putative dominant owner would be in a difficult position. She
would have no immediate rights in the servient tenement; and she would have to
initiate costly and lengthy litigation to acquire an easement, without guaranteed
success.72
Accordingly, the solution that I suggest here is somewhat simpler. It starts
from a perspective that while the integrity of the register is a critical
component of the Torrens system, today our first principles examination must
talk in terms of the integrity of the system.73 This encompasses not only the
66 Dobbie (1991) 23 NSWLR 625, 648.
67 Ibid 650.
68 Robert R Torrens, ‘The South Australian System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title’
[1859] Australian Colonial Law Monographs.
69 (1995) 183 CLR 633.
70 As Burns, above n 29, 6 n 35 notes, in looking at the US jurisdictions that considered
Torrens title, some left out any consideration of easements as an exception, others had a
widely drafted exception, whereas others put a temporal constraint on when they would be
an exception to indefeasibility.
71 Peter Butt, ‘The Conveyancer’ (1987) 61 Australian Law Journal 660, 660–2.
72 Burns, above n 29, 24.
73 As Burns, above n 29, 25 notes: ‘In the future, the integrity of the Torrens system will not
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magic of indefeasibility but also the recognition that legislation exceptions,
common law incursions, and overriding legislation will continue to mould and
shape the character and context of indefeasibility — as it always has done.
Rather than viewing these incursions as undermining the concept, it is time
that a common structure is sought across the states and territories, based on
how it was originally understood, and in line with what a functioning land
administration system must do in matching or aligning with community
expectations. We learn from where we originated to determine where we are
going.
The solution is twofold. First, we need to adopt a broad recognition of what
was intended by the omissions exception to indefeasibility and the suggestion
made is that we adopt what was proposed by the Victorian Law Reform
Commission in 2010.74 The second element is that each state and territory
include a provision, with this already existing in some, that would see the
registration of the benefit of an easement on the dominant tenement as
conclusive evidence that such an easement exists. It is the combination of
these aspects that are critical. The wide exception to indefeasibility and the
conclusive evidence provision, as interpreted by the early cases75 in this area,
provide the historical support on which we can case our normative
understanding.76
The Victorian Law Reform Commission proposals
The suggestions made by the Victorian Law Reform Commission were to the
effect that a registered title would be subject to:
any easements howsoever acquired before a specified date, and the following
easements that are created or arise after a specified date:
(a) created or implied by statute or by common law;
(b) easements at any time omitted from, or misdescribed in, the register.77
Noting that difficult issues arise in relation to omitted easements, the
Commission rejected the view of the Law Institute of Victoria that would see
omitted and misdescribed easements as unenforceable against subsequent
servient owners.78 The importance of rights of use that dominant owners rely
upon, and to move towards consistency with other states, dictated that a wide
exception was mandated.79
only require the accuracy of the register, but also a broader utility — a responsiveness to
those situations in which parties inadvertently and innocently fail to protect their interests.’
74 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 11.
75 These cases include Webster v Strong (1926) VLR 509; Stevenson v James (1889) 15 VLR
615, 624; Re Transfer of Land Statute and Application of Byrne; Ex parte Metropolitan
Permanent Building and Investment Society (1884) 10 VLR (L) 631, 366.
76 Additional statutory provisions which would assist the machinery of this would include a
capacity in the registrar to correct errors in the Register, (for Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
ss 12(1)(d)–(d1); Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 103(2)(a); Land Title Act 1994 (Qld)
s 15(1)(a); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 220(f); Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
ss 188(1)–(3), 189(1); Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 139(1); Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT)
ss 14(1)(e), 160; Land Title Act (NT) s 17(1).
77 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 11.
78 Ibid 61 [4.134].
79 Ibid [4.135]–[4.136].
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The implementation of such a move is also consistent, as noted with what
was stated in the original legislation, but more importantly, satisfies a
contemporary need today where the rise of smaller, more dense living areas,
means that people’s wellbeing and relationship to their land is dependent on
the relationship and behaviour of those that live close by.80
The register as evidence of easements
To ensure a common national understanding of when the omitted easement
exception would apply, the second suggestion is that each state introduce a
provision that would provide that registration on the dominant tenement that
the easement exists is conclusive evidence of such a right. Provisions of this
nature already exist, with, for example, Western Australia reading as follows:
Whenever any certificate of title either already registered or issued or hereafter to be
registered or issued under any of the provisions or otherwise under the operation of
this Act shall contain any statement to the effect that the person named in the
certificate is entitled to any easement therein specified such statement shall be
received in all courts of law and equity as conclusive evidence that he is so
entitled.81
Tasmania,82 South Australia,83 and the Australian Capital Territory84 contain
similar provisions as to the effect of the easement, with the remaining states
and territories only appearing to have broad provisions about the
conclusiveness of the register.85 The specialist provisions were the subject of
comment by Toohey J in Parramore v Duggan where his Honour suggested
that in the context of s 106 of the Tasmanian Land Titles Act 1980:
[The conclusiveness of the easement being noted on the dominant tenement must be
linked with indefeasibility] which lists those circumstances in which the title of a
registered proprietor is not indefeasible ... Section 106(1) is an evidentiary
provision. It prevents a collateral attack upon the existence of an easement to which
80 On an allied topic, this is explicitly recognised in the Strata Titles Act 1998 (Tas) s 91(3).
By-laws in strata schemes are invalid if they are unreasonable, or if they can affect the
health, welfare or safety of an individual.
81 Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 64.
82 Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 106(1):
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a statement in a folio of the Register to the effect that the
land comprised in the folio has the benefit of an easement shall be conclusive evidence
that the land has that benefit.
83 Real Property Act 1886 s 87:
Every certificate issued before the eighteenth day of November, 1881, containing therein
a statement to the effect that the registered proprietor is seized of the land therein
described, subject to or together with any right-of-way therein described or delineated,
or together with any easement therein described, shall be deemed to operate as a grant
or reservation, as the case may be, of such right-of-way or other easement, and such
certificate shall, except in the case of fraud, be received in all Courts as conclusive
evidence of the existence of such right-of-way or other easement ...
84 Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) s 53(4):
Where any grant or certificate of title contains a statement to the effect that the person
named therein is entitled to any easement therein specified, the statement shall be
conclusive evidence that he or she is so entitled.
85 See Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 40; Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 41; Land Title
Act 1994 (Qld) ss 46, 179; Land Title Act (NT) ss 47, 182.
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the title refers. But it does not preclude reliance upon any other provision of the Act
which confers indefeasibility of title upon the registered proprietor of servient land
free from the easement ... Section 106(1) would give force to the respondent’s claim
in the absence of any such provision or where there was a provision which made all
easements exceptions to the indefeasibility provided by the Act as was the position
in a number of Victorian cases.86
While it is difficult to know what was meant by collateral attack87 by his
Honour, with no previous nor subsequent case seeming to address this, the
importance of what his Honour says is that reliance on common law authority
where the registration of the easement on the dominant tenement was
conclusive evidence of its existence (in the literal meaning of this) can be had
where the legislative provision is drafted widely. In suggesting this, it is
important to note the early Victorian authority88 supports this conclusion. For
example in Webster v Strong,89 the plaintiff was entitled to a right of carriage
way over adjoining land, with this noted on his certificate of title. The servient
tenement’s certificate made no specific mention of this right of carriage way.
The evidence established that for many years, the dominant owner, and the
predecessors in title had used the access only as a footway, or for the ingress
and egress of carriages that could fit through a 4-foot wide access, and not for
the passage of carriages wider than this. There had been acquiescence in its
use only as a footway or limited access way, with this sufficient to constitute
common law abandonment of the easement. The common law principles were,
however, subjugated to the conclusiveness of the register. While it remained
on the dominant owner’s title, it could be enforced, and evidence on the title
of the dominant owner was conclusive of the easement’s existence. Similarly,
in Stevenson v James90 the omission by the registrar to enter an easement on
the servient owner’s land did not relieve the servient owner of liability.
86 (1995) 183 CLR 633, 643.
87 Speculating, it is suggested that his Honour was possibly considering how an easement
could be defeated by some other means, such as an argument surrounding abandonment,
release (express or implied), or by other grounds such as estoppel, even though the easement
is still registered on title. This view is consistent with a number of the earliest cases
considering the interaction between the ‘conclusive evidence’ provision and the exception to
indefeasibility for omitted easements. Eg, in Webster v Strong (1926) VLR 509, the then
Transfer of Land Act 1915 (Vic) s 68 was clear that the certificate of title of the dominant
tenement, when referencing an easement, was conclusive evidence that the person was
entitled to that easement. In argument, it was indicated that common law evidence of
abandonment could not be set up in derogation of the benefit of the easement, which was
conclusively established by the certificate of title of the dominant owner: at 512. Another
possibility is that grounds which operate beyond the confines of land law, such as
restitutionary principles cannot be used to deny the benefit of the easement to the dominant
owner (eg, the dominant owner would be unjustly enriched by the recognition of the
easement burdening another person whose title does not evidence the easement).
A thank you is expressed to the Land Titles Office, Tasmania, for discussing ideas as to what
is meant by a collateral attack.
88 Webster v Strong (1926) VLR 509; Stevenson v James (1889) 15 VLR 615, 624; Re Transfer
of Land Statute and Application of Byrne; Ex parte Metropolitan Permanent Building and
Investment Society (1884) 10 VLR (L) 631, 366.
89 (1926) VLR 509.
90 (1889) 15 VLR 615.
350 (2018) 26 Australian Property Law Journal
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 59 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Tue Apr 10 18:00:28 2018
/journals/journal/aplj/vol26pt3/part_3
If the plaintiffs, as owners of the dominant tenement, had obtained a statement in the
certificate under this provision [the conclusive evidence provision], the certificate
would be conclusive ...91
Bringing both elements together
The necessity for change is obvious. Litigation of the nature of Castle
Constructions and Howlin serves no-one. And while legislative provisions
today, and one suspects the practice of registrars, would be to record
easements on both the dominant and servient tenements,92 there is no way of
knowing how many dominant tenements do not have the easement recorded
on the corresponding servient tenement. As Butt asks:
And would such an obligation [to search nearby titles] arise only if hinted at by
something in the physical characteristics of the land being purchased or mortgaged?
Or would it be absolute, regardless of the physical circumstances discoverable by
on-site inspection?93
We are, as Brennan J commented in Mabo v Queensland [No 2],94 a ‘prisoner
of [our] history’,95 and the ‘skeleton of principle’96 that gives land law its
internal consistency and coherency demands that it respond to the existence
and prevalence of easements that may occur in practice, but are not seen to be
registered on the servient land. The surveying mistakes of the past need not
result in an undermining of the integrity of the Torrens system. As long ago
as 1971 in the seminal authority of Breskvar v Wall, Barwick CJ commented
on the regret associated with a lack of uniformity surrounding Torrens
legislation;97 and while our political masters may take a number of
generations to garner the political will to address this, there is no doubt that
given the importance of land in this country, as far as possible, we strive to
achieve a common understanding of the core precepts, such as the exceptions
to indefeasibility that influence Torrens jurisprudence.98
91 Ibid 624.
92 Eg, Land Title Act 1925 (ACT) s 103B; Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 47; Land Title Act
1994 (Qld) s 85A; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 88; Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) s 15;
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic) s 72; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) s 65A. I was not able
to locate an equivalent provision in the Northern Territory, though see Land Title Act 2000
(NT) s 91.
93 Peter Butt, ‘Conveyancing and property’ (2016) 90 Australian Law Journal 217, 219.
94 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
95 Ibid 29.
96 Ibid.
97 (1971) 126 CLR 376, 386.
98 See the comments by Kirby P, in Dobbie (1991) 23 NSWLR 625, 631:
Whilst the absence of complete uniformity in Torrens legislation throughout Australia
was described as a matter for regret by Barwick CJ in Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR
376 at 386, it is undesirable that courts in different parts of Australia should adopt, in
respect of the meaning of such legislation, markedly different approaches, unless the
different language of the local statute warrants a special and different approach to its
meaning. Interests in land represent a major component of property interests in this
country. For ordinary people, such interests normally represent their most valuable
property rights. For business and commerce, interests in land are a valuable economic
commodity. Sometimes, variations in the text of local legislation will necessitate a
different interpretation even of the same words. But unless such variations are clearly
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But of course, it must be noted that Sir Robert Torrens himself made no
mention of easements in the historical work that now bears his name99 —
easements were something that was not even considered central to the core
functions of the majesty of indefeasibility. But when the legislation began its
journey, easements quickly gained special protection, and it is easy to
understand way. Our land law system has been shaped, if not constructed, by
the operation and acceptance of the doctrine of tenure. People were not to be
seen as the absolute owners of land, rather, land was to be gotten hold of by
the Crown, with the concept of seisin central to that. ‘The principles of
English real property law, with socage tenure as the basis, were introduced
into the colony [of New South Wales] from the beginning — all lands of the
territory lying in the grant of the Crown, and until granted forming a royal
demesne.’100 Litigated matters such as Castle Constructions and Howlin
demonstrate why easements were to be protected. The notion of possession
that was central to tenure, and a person with the longstanding benefit of an
easement that was used to access the property, should not be denied the
benefits despite its absence from the title. What decisions of this nature invoke
is a requirement that not only should the title of the property being purchased
be checked, but that titles to properties not even being bought should be
investigated. One could only imagine what Sir Robert Torrens would think of
such a development.101 It is too late to reverse that trend, but what can be done
is a coherence of national thinking as to how we can minimise the litigation
surrounding omitted easements. The first development is to have a wide
exception to indefeasibility in line with what was proposed by the Victorian
Law Reform Commission. The second is for the legislative to establish a view
that the easement appearing on the dominant tenement is conclusive evidence
that the easement in fact exists. And third, a practice that easements are
recorded on both the dominant and servient tenements. It will take time, effort
and political will for this to occur, but if it is possible to get agreement on one
small aspect, perhaps that can be the wedge that promotes a project to develop
a truly national Torrens framework, something which has been 170 years in
the making, and at least 118 years overdue. Our omission in relation to a
national jurisprudence on easements is merely a symbol of our omission to
achieve a national land administration system. We now have national
corporate legislation,102 national consumer legislation,103 national legislation
on personal properties,104 yet the very thing that connects us with the planet
remains fragmented and divided. Fixing the omitted exceptions is but a small
step on a long journey, but it is a journey that must be begun.
justified, there is much to be said for adopting a uniform approach to the construction of
common basic provisions of the legislation ...
99 Torrens, above n 68 — a search of this text does not reveal that the word easement is ever
used.
100 Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54, 71 (Windeyer J).
101 See similar comments made by Butt, ‘The Conveyancer’, above n 71, 661.
102 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
103 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 sch 2.
104 Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth).
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